The article investigates information flow properties of symmetric multi-party protocols. It gives a sound and complete axiomatic system for properties of the functional dependence predicate that are common to all protocols with the same group of symmetries.
1. Introduction
Symmetric Protocols
In this article we study properties of information flow under symmetric protocols. An example of such a protocol is the parity encryption protocol illustrated in Figure 1 . Under this protocol, party p sends a binary message a to a party q. Then q encodes it into b using random encryption key c in such a way that a ≡ b + c (mod 2). It sends both the encrypted message b and the key c to party r. Party r decrypts message using formula d ≡ b + c (mod 2) and sends the result to party s. This protocol is symmetric in the sense that if a = x, b = y, c = z, d = t is a valid set of values under this protocol, then so is a = x, b = z, c = y, d = t. We will formally express it by saying that permutation
is a symmetry of the protocol. We will also use a graphical way to describe symmetry σ as shown in Figure 2 . Another example of a symmetric protocol is an anonymous vote protocol. If a, b, and c represent votes of three different parties and m the majority vote, then if a = x, b = y, c = z, m = t is a valid set of values, then so is a = y, b = z, c = y, m = t or any other permutation of these values that preserves m. Using the language of abstract algebra, symmetries of this protocol are all permutations in the stabilizer subgroup of the element m.
In general, we specify symmetries of an information flow protocol by giving a group of permutations under which the protocol is invariant in the described above sense. The formal definition will be given in Section 3 below. Properties of symmetry in information [13] and especially in applications to model checking [7] have been studied before.
Functional Dependence
The properties of information flow protocols between different pieces of information, from now on referred to as secrets, can be studied in different languages. The language is specified by the choice of the predicate(s) it is using. A natural example of such predicate that we will be using in this article is functional dependence, which we denote by a b. It means that the value of secret a reveals the value of secret b. A more general form of functional dependence is functional dependence between sets of secrets. If A and B are two sets of secrets, then A B means that, together, the values of all secrets in A reveal the values of all secrets in B. Armstrong [1] presented the following sound and complete axiomatization of this relation:
The above axioms are known in database literature as Armstrong's axioms [4, p. 81 ]. Beeri, Fagin, and Howard [2] suggested a variation of Armstrong's axioms that describe properties of multi-valued dependence. Naumov and Nicholls axiomatized a related relation of rationally functional dependence in strategic games [14] .
Another natural relation between secrets is the "nondeducibility" predicate introduced by Sutherland [15] . Halpern and O'Neill [5] proposed a closely-related notion called f -secrecy. More and Naumov [10] studied this relation between sets of secrets. A logical system that combines independence and functional dependence predicates was described by Kelvey, More, Naumov, and Sapp [6] . The relation on secrets, "secret a knows at least as much about secret c as secret b does" was axiomatized by More, Naumov, Nicholls, and Yang [12] . The properties of the information flow predicates that are specific to topological structure of the communication network have been also previously studied [3, 8, 9, 11] .
In this article we study properties of functional dependence between single secrets in symmetric protocols. For example, consider a broadcasting protocol where party p upon receiving a message a sends messages b and c to parties q and r respectively. We first assume that p sends identical, but possibly different from a, messages b and c. This protocol has a symmetry σ depicted in Figure 3 . It is clear that under this protocol b c. Note however, that if one considers another protocol, under which messages b and c do not have to be identical, then property b c is no longer true in spite of the fact that the new protocol has the same symmetry σ. Thus, this property is specific to a protocol, not to the symmetry. In this article we study properties of the functional dependence between single secrets that are common to all protocols with the same group of symmetries. An example of such property for the group generated by symmetry σ depicted in Figure 3 is b c → c b. This property is an instance of the Symmetry axiom in our logical system.
The Symmetry axiom is a very general principle, which is not specific to the functional dependence predicate. It is true for any predicate on a symmetric domain. An example of a property specific to the functional dependence predicate for the group generated by symmetry σ is a b → b c. Indeed, since a is a fixed point of this symmetry the only way for a to reveal value of b is when values of b and c are equal. In this case, b c. This property is an instance of the Stability axiom in our logical system. Our main result is a completeness of the logical system that contains the Symmetry and Stability axioms and two additional not-symmetry-related properties of functional dependence.
Group Theory Terminology
In this section we review group theory vocabulary used throughout the rest of the paper.
In abstract algebra, a group is a pair G = (Σ, ·), where Σ is an arbitrary set and · is an associative binary operation on Σ such that Σ contains an identity element and an inverse element for each element of Σ.
In this article, for any fixed set S by a group acting on S we mean an arbitrary set of permutations G of S (bijections from S onto S) such that 1. G is closed with respect to composition •,
By orbit Orbit G (s) of element s ∈ S with respect to group G we mean the set {σ(s) | σ ∈ G}. By a stabilizer set G s of an element s we mean the set {σ ∈ G | σ(s) = s}. It is easy to see that G s is a subgroup of G.
Syntax and Semantics
In this section we give a formal definition of a protocol symmetric with respect to a particular group of symmetries. Definition 1. For any set S (of "secrets"), let Φ(S) be the minimal set of formulas such that
Definition 2. Let S be any set and G be any group acting on S. A symmetric protocol P over (S, G) is a pair (V, R) such that
The next definition is the core definition of this article. Part 2 of this definition formally specifies relation a b between two secrets.
Definition 3. For any protocol P = (V, R) over (S, G) and any formula φ ∈ Φ(S), truth relation P φ is defined recursively as follows:
1. P ⊥, 2. P a b if and only if for any runs r 1 , r 2 ∈ R, if r 1 (a) = r 2 (a), then r 1 (b) = r 2 (b), 3. P φ → ψ if and only if P φ or P ψ.
Axioms
In this section we introduce a logical system for properties of functional dependence in a protocol with a given group of symmetries G acting on the set of secrets S. The axioms of our logical system are:
We write G φ if formula φ ∈ Φ(S) is provable from the above axioms and propositional tautologies in the language Φ(S) using the modus ponens inference rule. We write X G φ if formula φ is provable in our logical system using an additional set of axioms X.
Examples
In this section we give several examples of proofs in our formal system. Soundness and completeness of the system will be shown later. As common in abstract algebra, by σ 1 , . . . , σ n we denote the group generated by symmetries σ 1 , . . . , σ n . Proof. Assume a c. Thus
by the Symmetry axiom. In other words, c a.
Example 3. If group G = σ, τ is acting, as shown in Figure 6 , on set {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i}, then
by the Stability axiom. Hence, G a f → f e.
The next two propositions are theorems provable in our system. We will refer to them later.
k (a) a, for any non-negative integer k, any σ ∈ G, and any a ∈ S.
Proof. Meta induction on parameter k. If k = 0, then
by the Reflexivity axiom. Next, assume that for k ≥ 0. Thus, by the Symmetry axiom,
Therefore, by the Transitivity axiom,
Due to set Orbit(b) being finite, there must exist i > j ≥ 0 such that Next, we will show that Proposition 2 is false without the assumption that Orbit G (b) is finite. The example of the protocol for which this proposition does not hold can be constructed using a variation of Hilbert's infinite Grand Hotel. We will assume that the hotel has a countably infinite set of rooms numbered by all integers: . . . , −2, −1, 0, 1, 2, . . . . Each room is occupied by a guest and each guest knows names of all guests in the rooms with numbers no higher than hers. Thus, for example, guest in the room 27 knows who occupies rooms 27, 26, 25, and so on. Let secret s i represent the knowledge of the guest in the room i ∈ Z. Note that s i+1 s i is true, but s i s i+1 is false. Different runs of this protocol correspond to different room assignments to the guest of the hotel. Consider symmetry σ of this protocol such that σ(s i ) = s i+1 . This provides an infinite "counterexample" to Proposition 2.
In the next two examples we assume that σ is function x/2 on real numbers. Thus, group G = σ acts on the set S = R of all real numbers. Proof. See Proposition 1.
Example 5. For any integer n,
Proof. Note that σ n ∈ G 0 . Thus, by the Stability axiom, G 0 1 → 1 1 2 n .
Soundness
Theorem 1. If G φ, then P φ, for any group G acting on set S, any φ ∈ Φ(S), and any protocol P over (S, G).
Proof. We will prove soundness of each axiom as a separate lemma. Each of the individual proofs relies upon Definition 3.
Lemma 1 (reflexivity). P a a for each protocol P over (S, G) and each a ∈ S.
Proof. If r 1 (a) = r 2 (a), then r 1 (a) = r 2 (a).
Lemma 2 (transitivity).
For any secrets a, b, c ∈ S and any protocol P over (S, G), if P a b and P b c, then P a c.
Proof. Suppose that r 1 (a) = r 2 (a), then, by the first assumption, r 1 (b) = r 2 (b) . Therefore, by the second assumption, r 1 (c) = r 2 (c).
Lemma 3 (symmetry). For any protocol P over (S, G), any secrets a, b ∈ S, and any symmetry σ ∈ G, if P a b, then P σ(a) σ(b).
Proof. Suppose that r 1 (σ(a)) = r 2 (σ(a)). Thus, (r 1 • σ)(a) = (r 2 • σ)(a). Hence, by the assumption of the lemma, (r 1 • σ)(b) = (r 2 • σ) (b) . Therefore, r 1 (σ(b)) = r 2 (σ(b)).
Lemma 4 (stability).
For any protocol P = (V, R) over (S, G), any secrets a, b ∈ S, and any symmetry σ ∈ G a , if P a b, then P b σ(b).
Proof. We first will show that for any run r ∈ R:
Indeed, a = σ(a) because σ ∈ G a . Thus, r(a) = r(σ(a)). In other words, r(a) = (r • σ)(a). Hence, by the assumption of the lemma, r(b) = (r • σ) (b) .
To finish the proof of the lemma, suppose that r 1 (b) = r 2 (b). Hence, r 1 (σ(b)) = r 2 (σ(b)) by the equation (2). This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Completeness
Theorem 2. For any group G acting on set S and any φ ∈ Φ(S), if G φ, then there is a protocol P over (S, G) such that P G φ.
We start the proof of the completeness theorem with several technical definitions and lemmas. The proof of the theorem itself appears in Section 7.3.
Protocol P b
Let X be any subset of Φ(S) and b be any element of S. In this section we will define protocol P b . Later we will prove the completeness theorem by combining such protocols for all b ∈ S.
Orbits partition set S into disjoint subsets. We pick a unique representative from each orbit. If a ∈ S, then the unique representative of Orbit G (a) is denoted byâ. We will next define V (a) for each element a ∈ S. Elements from the same orbit will have the same set V (a). 
Lemma 5. V (σ(a)) = V (a) for each a ∈ S and each σ ∈ G.
Definition 5. A function r is a run if and only if for all a 1 , a 2 ∈ S, all z 1 , z 2 ∈ Orbit G (b), and all σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ G if
Lemma 6. If r ∈ R, then r • µ ∈ R for each µ ∈ G.
Proof. Suppose that for some a 1 , a 2 ∈ S, some z 1 , z 2 ∈ Orbit G (b), and some σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ G:
We will prove that r(µ(a 1 ))(z 1 ) = r(µ(a 2 ))(z 2 ). Indeed, µ(a 1 ) = a 1 , because µ(a 1 ) ∈ Orbit(a 1 ). Similarly, µ(a 2 ) = a 2 . Thus,
Hence,
Thus, by the assumption r ∈ R and Definition 5,
This completes the definition of the protocol P b .
Proof. Let r 1 , r 2 be two valid runs of the protocol P b . Suppose that r 1 (c) = r 2 (c). We will show that r 1 (d) = r 2 (d). Let z be any element of Orbit G (b). It will be sufficient to show that
We will now assume that
Let c = σ 1 (ĉ) and d = σ 2 (d) for some σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ G. Next, we will use Definition 5 to show that r 1 (c)(σ
To do so, we need to verify conditions 1.-5. of Definition 5:
Thus, X d σ 2 (z) by the choice of σ 2 . By the Transitivity axiom and the assumption of the lemma, X c σ 2 (z). Hence, X σ 1 (ĉ) σ 2 (z), by the choice of σ 1 . By the Symmetry axiom, X σ
Finally, note that equations (4) and (5) Proof. Suppose that σ 1 (ĉ) = σ 2 (ĉ). We will show that if X σ 1 (z) b and
. Thus, by the assumption X ĉ z and the Stability axiom, X z σ −1 2 (σ 1 (z)). Hence, by the Symmetry axiom, X σ 2 (z) σ 1 (z). Therefore, X σ 2 (z) b by the Transitivity axiom and the assumption X σ 1 (z) b.
Lemma 10. r 1 is a run of the protocol P b .
Proof. Consider any a 1 , a 2 ∈ S, any z 1 , z 2 ∈ Orbit G (b), and any σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ G such that
Protocol Composition
In this section we introduce a way to combine several different protocols over (S, G) into a single protocol. R 1 ) , . . . , P n = (V n , R n ) are protocols over (S, G),
R is a set of all functions r(x) = r 1 (x), . . . , r n (x) for all r 1 ∈ R 1 , . . . , r n ∈ R n .
Hence, by the assumption of the lemma, r
Thus, by the assumption of the lemma, r
Completeness: final steps
We are now ready to finish the proof of the completeness theorem that has been stated earlier as Theorem 2. Proof. Assume that G φ. Let X be a maximal consistent subset of Φ(S) that contains ¬φ. Let S = {b 1 , . . . , b n }. For each i ≤ n consider defined above protocol P b i and define P = P b 1 × · · · × P bn . Proof. Induction on the structural complexity of formula ψ. Case ψ being ⊥ follows from the assumption of consistency of X and Definition 3. If ψ is an atomic formula a b, then statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 15. The induction step follows from the maximality and consistence of set X in the standard way.
Recall now that ¬φ ∈ X. Hence, φ / ∈ X due to consistency of X. Therefore, P φ by Lemma 16. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
Conclusion
In this article with gave a complete axiomatization of properties of functional dependence in symmetric protocols. We have been assuming that a symmetry is a bijection of the set into itself. In a more general setting, symmetries can be defined as injections of the set into itself. The set of bijective symmetries forms a group with respect to composition. The injective symmetries only form a monoid (informally, group without inverses). An example of an injective symmetry is an injection of the Sierpinski triangle (see Figure 7) into the upper quarter of the triangle. It is easy to check that our axioms are sound with respect to such symmetries. Let, for example, a, b, and c be the points of the Sierpinski triangle as shown in Figure 7 and M be the monoid of injective symmetries of the Sierpinski triangle. Then, M a c → a b by the Symmetry axiom and Another open question is an axiomatization of properties of functional dependencies between sets of secrets for a given group of symmetries. Such axiomatization would include Armstrong axiom, the Symmetry axiom, the Stability axiom, and, possibly, some other not yet discovered properties.
